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Strategic dilemmas of pre -election marketing  
in the age of the mediatisation of politics:  
The case of the Warsaw referendum of 2013
Abstract: The referendum on the dismissal of the President of Warsaw Hanna Gronkiewicz-
Waltz before the end of her term was a part of a series of political events that could affect the 
power arrangement on the Polish political scene, especially on the market position of the Civic 
Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) parties. 
By analysing the actions taken by the main political actors in the pre -referendum period, two 
basic issues should be resolved: if political -market entities actually carry out their long -term 
political strategies and whether the adopted strategy translates into a specific and clear market‑
ing concept of pre -election activities in the prevalent Polish political realm. Regardless, how‑
ever, of the adopted strategic option, competing political entities should take into account the 
obvious fact that the mass media are responsible for delimiting the area of political discourse 
and for defining matters which are a subject thereof.
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The referendum on the dismissal of the President of Warsaw Hanna 
Gronkiewicz -Waltz before the end of her term, set to take place on 13 Octo‑
ber 2013, was a part of a series of political events that significantly affect‑
ed or could potentially affect the power arrangement on the Polish political 
scene — especially the market position of the Civic Platform (PO) and the 
Law and Justice (PiS) parties. This does not, however, change the fact that 
from the perspective of almost all entities involved in political competition, 
the Warsaw referendum as well as all previous events (dismissal referendum 
and early elections of the President of Elbląg, by -elections to the senate in 
Rybnik and the Podkarpackie Province) can be considered extraordinary, 
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in this sense, complex endeavours, carrying relatively high political risk. 
They needed to be correlated with the political strategy then implemented. 
The level of the market risk involved (image -wise and based on the scale 
of engagement of party resources: personnel and material) was undoubtedly 
raised by the pre -election (election cycle of 2014—2015) context of the cam‑
paigns leading up to the dismissal referenda in Elbląg and Warsaw and the 
by ‑elections to the Senate.
While analysing the actions taken by the main political actors during the 
pre -referendum period, two basic issues need to be resolved: 1) if market 
entities actually carry out their long -term political strategies1 and 2) whether 
the adopted strategy translates into a specific and clear marketing concept of 
pre -election activities in the prevalent Polish political realm. Assuming that 
a consequence of the evolutionary process of professionalisation of political 
parties is a clear (also in Poland) intention to achieve an orderly organisa‑
tion of actions undertaken and carried out in the period between particular 
elections (between election campaigns to be precise) leads us to the conclu‑
sion that every unplanned event in an external political and non -political 
environment can serve as a basis for modifying, reorienting or changing 
the political strategy of a given entity. In other words, from the perspective 
of an entity involved in political competition such events can be considered 
as specific opportunities (market opportunities) which provide a chance to 
strengthen (stabilise support in the various segments of the electorate) or 
improve (extension of support) of the market position, taking into account 
the potential risks associated with undertakings going beyond the initial 
strategic considerations. Therefore, by modifying/changing the strategy, 
a distinction should be made between the risk that allows objectives to be 
determined and the chances of their achievement to be measured, and the 
risk where calculation of the potential effects is in fact impossible or very 
difficult to estimate.2
From the point of view of a particular political entity, evaluation of the 
market usability of the opportunities emerging from the external environment 
is strongly associated with the general scheme of creating political strategy 
— a higher level of strategic flexibility can be attributed to entities whose 
strategy is based on the correlation of pragmatic objectives and instrumen‑
tal values, than to entities which form strategies based on preferred political 
1 Given that the long -term nature of the strategy means organising political activities 
during the period between elections, which are key for the market position of a political 
entity, in the context of the activities prepared and carried out by PO and PiS, it should be 
assumed that the time period for realising the strategy is until the consecutive parliamentary 
elections.
2 See M. Kolcz y ńsk i: Strategie komunikowania politycznego. Katowice 2007, p. 41; 
P.F. Dr ucker: Skuteczne zarządzanie. Warszawa 1976, pp. 292 ff.
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values of a fundamental nature (not subject to marginalization, regardless of 
the market factors).
Also, one cannot forget that a modification/change of strategy is not 
(should not be) a sole derivative of setup modification of factors determin‑
ing the scope of action of political actors in the external environment; in the 
process of strategy creation it is necessary to take into account the avail‑
able resources: personnel (human potential: qualifications, skills, motivation 
and commitment of individual members of a political organization), material 
and technology. The essential dilemma of contemporary actors in political 
competition comes down to whether and to what extent an entity has a real 
capability to distance itself from the stimuli which are coming from the sur‑
rounding environment in a situation of excessive risk or limitations of an 
entity’s own resources. The autonomy of decision in respect to the matching 
of strategy to the requirements of the environment, is limited by three groups 
of factors related to: 1) projects carried out by the competition, 2) expec‑
tations of potential voters, 3) activities undertaken by media broadcasters. 
The analysis and response of entities involved in political competition to the 
factors belonging to the first two groups, usually involves standard decision-
making procedures; in the case of media interaction, the reaction is non-
standard and is a derivative of: 1) the development of the media system (in 
quantitative and competitive terms), 2) the quality of the relationship between 
the individual entities and media broadcasters, and 3) the level of exposure of 
the content relating to political competition in the mass media.
However, regardless of the adopted strategy, competing political entities 
should take into account the obvious fact that the mass media of today are 
responsible for delimiting the area of political discourse and for defining mat‑
ters which are the subject thereof. Media broadcasters actually decide when 
and which events require high media exposure — mass media often use facts 
which draw the audience’s attention to create a specific (sometimes intense 
and surprisingly ephemeral) information performance involving a significant 
and temporary increase of interest (of the media and audience) in some issues 
or political events (hence the importance of knowing the criteria for selection 
of information).
By giving importance to individual pieces of information, broadcast‑
ers not only influence the direct individual recipients, but also the political 
organisations. By emphasising a given issue, they push politicians to take 
a stand (to make a decision on how to respond) — the communication rela‑
tionship established this way between the political and media broadcasters 
naturally contributes to an intensification of publicity (modification of the 
public agenda) and an increase in the political importance of a given issue 
(structuring of the political agenda). In this context, the effectiveness of polit‑
ical actions is correlated with the ability to assess the course of transfor‑
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mation of the media environment and the capability of the political entities 
to adjust the strategic concepts to the requirements defined by the modified 
media environment. In practice, this means submission of the political strat‑
egy to the mechanisms of contemporary mass media — in particular, a modi‑
fication of communication strategy which would take into account the trends 
visible in the actions of contemporary media (mainly informational media) 
resulting from the process of commercialisation of the mass media, such as: 
1) domination of the interpretative and defining function over the information 
function, 2) a qualitatively new means (infotainment) of formatting informa‑
tion programmes (including current affairs programmes on political events), 
which would include a dramatisation and emotionalisation of messages.
In this understanding of the role of mass media in the process of creating 
(reorienting, changing) political strategy, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the effectiveness of pre -election actions is correlated with obtaining of a real 
impact by a political entity on shaping the media agenda that would result in 
achieving the expected level of publicity/exposure of its own agenda. How‑
ever, it should be taken into account that agenda setting is, in fact, a complex 
process, involving the mass media, political organizations and the audience, 
as a result of which the selection and media exposure criteria are determined 
for the individual political issues (the final political topics hierarchy is formed 
by the interaction between the particular entities of the media, politics and 
the public). With the assumption that the media is relatively independent, it 
is considered that agenda setting involves the publication of a certain type of 
political information at a specific place and time, with the right intensity and 
— in most cases — it is not synonymous with the intentional impact aimed 
at shaping opinions, attitudes and behaviours of the political audience.
The capabilities (measured by impact) and the extent of the interference 
of political entities into a thematic agenda of the media result primarily 
from: (a) the nature of events/political activities and, above all, their actual 
or implicit media attractiveness (which translates, from the point of view of 
media broadcasters, into a specific commercial value), (b) the quality of the 
long -term relationships between the political actors and the media (in the 
broad sense including: media owners, editorial boards and individual jour‑
nalists).
Taking into account the reasons indicated, it can be concluded that the 
subsequent political developments which took place in 2013, met the basic 
criteria allowing them to be recognised as “defining moments” in the process 
of political competition between the main actors on the Polish political scene, 
and thus encouraged both modification (Civic Platform), as well as reori‑
entation of strategy (Law and Justice) — and at least intensification of PR 
processes (mainly in the case of PiS). The developments also required deep 
reflection from the participating entities on how to meet the public expecta‑
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tions articulated by the mass media and how to medially capitalise on the 
actions taken, particularly with the approaching election cycle of 2014—2015 
in mind.
The key contextual considerations were clearly market ‑oriented and were 
associated with the dynamics of competition between the Civic Platform (PO) 
and Law and Justice (PiS) (at a relative stabilisation of the polls of the other 
parties) — the dynamics reflected by public opinion polls.
Fig. 1. Declared support for Civic Platform and Law and Justice, and the Democratic Left 
Alliance in the period January−October 2013 (%)
Sou rce: CBOS announcement BS/171/2013
From the perspective of PiS, 2013 brought about a significant improve‑
ment of market trends (actually a change of trend, namely that of the clear 
dominance of PO, which had remained stable since the last parliamentary 
elections of 2011), strengthening the position of the party as the main opposi‑
tion group and creating a solid foundation preparing PiS to start in the next 
elections, and ending, at least in theory, the party’s painful series of electoral 
defeats. In the case of the Civic Platform, the polls of February 2013 defini‑
tively ended its chances of continuing the existing market narrative (“PO 
has no real rival on the Polish political scene”) and necessitated the need for 
a more active response to the undertakings of PiS. However, the rather stable 
market position of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), accompanied by the fall‑
ing polls of PO and the relatively low polls of Polish People’s Party (PSL) 
(5−8%), meant that the party was not only the leader on the left side of the 
political spectrum, but also gave this party a chance to take over the role of 
a major participant in potential coalition rivalry.
Without any doubt, the observed changes also had important media- 
related effects. They caused the ongoing political competition to prompt 
a new way of formatting messages prepared for the Polish political market, 
putting issues relating to the upcoming elections in the spotlight.
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The dynamics of political competition before the Warsaw referendum 
were affected by the impact of the political clashes between PO and PiS 
concerning the referendum on the dismissal of the President of Elbląg.3 On 
4 April 2013, with a turnout of 24.67% (and with the vast majority support‑
ing the initiative) Grzegorz Owczak of PO was eventually dismissed. The 
pre -term presidential elections announced as a consequence of the results of 
the referendum (first round — 23 June, second round — 7 July4) were a scene 
of a spectacular battle between the main parties, with the intense involve‑
ment of party leaders (D. Tusk visited Elbląg three times: before and imme‑
diately after the first round of the elections and before the second round; 
J. Kaczyński personally supported the campaign of the local candidate Jerzy 
Wilk directly before the first and second rounds of the elections), who uti‑
lised political marketing resources and were accompanied by unprecedented 
(given the election level) interest of the mass media. The offensive actions of 
PiS, which had a well -formatted competitive electoral offer (albeit a heavily 
demagogical one5) produced an unexpected result in the form of the PiS can‑
didate’s victory, who achieved the best electoral result in Elbląg ever (a city 
considered the “political bastion” of PO). The mediality of the campaign was 
not only increased by the involvement of the most prominent politicians, but 
by its sharp/negative message — very attractive from the point of view of 
media broadcasters (for example the so -called “Wilk’s tapes” — recorded 
private speeches of the PiS’s candidate, in which he attacked his competitors 
and some allies in an unrefined way). More importantly, the victory of PiS in 
a symbolic way broke PO’s monopoly and visibly dynamised the actions of 
J. Kaczyński’s party.
The victory of Bolesław Piecha (PiS) in the by -elections to the senate in 
Rybnik (21 April 2013) also carried a similar, symbolic meaning — as every 
success in the province of Silesia in which it is difficult for PiS to win, this 
victory was of particular importance (especially when this involved taking 
over PO’s mandate). However, it should be pointed out that the results of the 
elections (in particular the voter turnout — 11.14%) point to a limited mobi‑
lisation potential of the leading political parties (including PiS — despite the 
personal participation of J. Kaczyński in the campaign — a visit in Rybnik 
on 15 April 2013).
3 The referendum was initiated by the local citizens committee “Free Elbląg” which 
accused the president of incompetence, arrogance and loss of social trust.
4 Voter turnout, largely due to the personal involvement of party leaders, was higher than 
in the referendum: 36.56% in the first round, 34.60% — in the second round of the elections. 
In the second round, J. Wilk won 51.40% of votes; according to: www.elblag.pkw.gov.pl.
5 There were, e.g. proposals to: make a passage to the sea on the Vistula Spit, create 
conditions to expand the port of Elbląg (fourth largest port in Poland), or make changes 
involving determination of the administrative region the city belongs to.
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The third major event in the pre -referendum period was the by -elections 
to the senate in the Podkarpackie Province (8 September 2013), in which 
PiS’s candidate Zdzisław Pupa won in a spectacular way (60.48% of the 
votes),6 confirming the regional dominance of the party, and depriving other 
right -wing politicians of any political illusions “along the way.” Given PiS’s 
significant involvement in the Warsaw referendum, the level of voter turn‑
out (15.48%) in the region where PiS and its political initiatives were always 
popular is considered as rather troubling.
In a situation of intensive dynamics of political events, a politically and 
strategically interesting clash took place in Warsaw in the context of referen‑
dum on the dismissal of H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz. No doubt the results of the 
referendum in Elbląg were a major impulse which activated the social and 
political forces present in the opposition (and taking advantage of the dissat‑
isfaction of a major part of the inhabitants of Warsaw) against the quality and 
style of governance of H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz. The body that initiated actions 
aimed at holding the referendum was the Warsaw Self -Government Com‑
munity (WWS), and the main character (in the initial phase of activity), its 
leader, was the Mayor of Warsaw’s Ursynów district, Piotr Guział. The basic 
allegations were of a local, Warsovian nature, and concerned: increase in the 
price of public transport tickets, garbage collection system arrangements and 
the lack of supervision over investments (especially in those events which 
affected the inhabitants — in particular supervision over the work on the 
second subway line). After rejection of the April (22nd) demands for with‑
drawal of the criticised regulations, on 16 May, WWS started collecting sig‑
natures for a petition to launch a referendum for dismissal (the actual petition 
was submitted on 23 May).
The initiative of WWS/Mr. Guział could be treated as a serious strategic 
challenge for most organisations — the leaders of every major party existing 
on the political market were contextually obliged to take a decision whether, 
to what extent, and in what way, to participate in the Warsaw referendum 
campaign.
It must be assumed that the final decision was based on the analysis of 
the contextual conditions, taking into account: 1) the basic parameters of 
the market (in static terms — the current situation and in dynamic terms 
— given the challenges of the 2014—2015 electoral cycle), and 2) a given 
entity’s own abilities (organisational, human resources, financial) in the pre-
election year.
6 The political and media potential to capitalise on this success were put out by pu-
blications of the Wprost weekly (in print and on the web) attacking the “immoral” be-
haviour of some of PiS’s activists (including Adam Hofman) in preparation for these elec‑
tions. 
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The analysis of the factors in the first group should include:
— the assessment of current market polls, with particular attention to the 
visible trends (long -term), changes/stabilisation of support for a given 
party entity;
— determination of the impact of the current extraordinary events (Elbląg, 
Rybnik, Podkarpackie Province) on change/stabilisation of support;
— execution of a similar evaluation for entities directly competing with each 
other for electoral support in various segments of the electorate;
— definition of a party’s market position in Warsaw (and thus the possibility 
of exerting a real impact on the referendum events);
— simulation of potential consequences (positive and negative) of the politi‑
cal involvement in the nation’s capital;
— the assessment of the ability to correlate activities related to the referen‑
dum with the needs of the first election campaigns in 2014 (of particular 
importance, at least in terms of planning, are the local elections and the 
election of the President of Warsaw).
On the other hand, an analysis of an entity’s own resources should resolve 
the following key issues:
— in the pre -election year, if the entity has the financial resources required 
to carry out activates which involve a relatively high level of risk;
— which politicians (either individually or as a group) should represent the 
party in the referendum campaign;
— in case of a successful referendum, if the entity is prepared (again: organ‑
izationally, financially, and in terms of human resources) to carry out the 
campaign preceding the early elections and, which has had to be consid‑
ered in particular, who would be the candidate with serious chances of 
winning the election (maximum option), or to ensure a result that would 
not weaken both (a) the current polls of the party and (b) the election 
chances of the entity in the upcoming 2014 elections (minimum option).
Of course, the key dilemma for all participants of the referendum battle 
was to estimate the chances of achieving the desired result — for this to be 
possible, it was necessary to convince 29.10% of the eligible voters (389,430 
votes) to vote. The task was extremely difficult, especially given the various 
demobilising actions which were organised by the city authorities (e.g. their 
promise to fulfil some of the demands of the inhabitants) or actions backed 
by the leading politicians of the Civic Platform — especially D. Tusk.
The basic, mutually related reasons against the involvement of party 
forces and means in the referendum campaign include:
— continued high support in Warsaw for PO and H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz 
(according to a few publicly available polls on the potential presidential 
elections in Warsaw, H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz was in the first place, and 
could count on support of about 30—40%; taking into account her elec‑
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tion result of 2010 at 53.67% and the relatively bad social atmosphere in 
Warsaw, these poll results may be considered as very good);
— uncertainty if the eligible voters in Warsaw would participate in the ref‑
erendum;
— the difficult to assess method of broadcasting the referendum events in 
the mass media (especially by television broadcasters).
In this context, the petition for the referendum may be considered as 
a certain kind of test of strength or assessment of the market. The peti‑
tion proceeded smoothly, with the declarative and organizational support 
from various political entities (ephemeral coalition of the political forces 
that are in opposition to PO: from the Palikot Movement to Zbigniew Zio‑
bro’s Solidary Poland) and civic associations. A total of 232,000 signatures 
were collected, almost over a hundred thousand more than the number 
required by law. It should be noted, however, that the initiators of the ref‑
erendum (WWS) — who copied the ideas of PiS used in the presidential 
campaign of 2010 — desired to make it a campaign event (collection of 
400,000 signatures), which would have a mobilisation effect (it would show 
the existence of a stable population within Warsaw determined to dismiss 
H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz).7
Fig. 2. The number of people declaring participation in the referendum in Warsaw (%)
Sou rce: Own work based on the results of TNS Poland and Millward Brown, as shown in the media
7 The vacation time certainly did not favour the campaign, but the final result put into 
question the professional preparation of the activities.
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A lot of confusion (and de facto decision -making uncertainty) was caused 
by the polls shown in the media that forecasted voter turnout in the referen‑
dum. The very superficial reporters’ interpretation failed to take into account 
two very important matters: 1) the tendency to overestimate the expect‑
ed number of voters in the turnout polls, 2) joint treatment of two differ‑
ent groups of respondents — those who were determined to participate in 
the referendum and those who did not rule it out. It should be noted that 
only in one of the published surveys the percentage of people determined 
to participate in the referendum exceeded the required validity threshold of 
29.10%.
The presented data clearly show the relatively low persuasive and mobi‑
lisation effectiveness preceding the referendum — the subjects pushing for 
the dismissal of H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz were unable to cause a permanent 
increase in the number of people declaring participation in the referendum 
because of the limited dynamics of the campaign and effective counterac‑
tions of the opposing side.
The difficult task of influencing the thematic agenda of the media was 
certainly a failure for the entities participating in the campaign; despite 
a relatively high interest in the referendum campaign, its media coverage 
was divergent: from local interpretative frameworks (rather in the case of the 
defensive measures taken by the H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz) to party competition 
frameworks (in the case of actions taken by opposition parties).
The campaign preceding the referendum in Warsaw put the Law and Jus‑
tice in a particularly complex strategic situation. Hypothetically, from the 
perspective of this entity, it could be conceived that in the favourable context 
(growth and stabilization of polls results, local elections successes) the refer‑
endum initiative created the possibility of another opportunity to strengthen 
the market position and focus the attention of potential voters and mass media 
on the political offer of this party. The fundamental problem of J. Kaczyński 
was the difficulty in calculating the risks associated with his intense involve‑
ment in activities preceding the referendum and it stemmed from the com‑
plexity of the context. Secondly, the situation of “a strategic crossroads” was 
a direct consequence of the contextual limitation of decision -making auton‑
omy caused largely by the way coverage of political competition in Poland 
was carried out by means of mass communication. Paradoxically, PiS was 
a strategic “hostage” of its earlier successes, which were formatted by the 
media as the “rebirth of PiS” (or at least as the “troubles of PO”), positioning 
PiS as a market leader having — at a given moment — political initiative. 
Failure to become involved in the referendum campaign would immediately 
alter the media narrative (to an unfavourable one again). However, the party’s 
involvement in the campaign resulted in its engagement in activity, which 
PiS was not prepared for conceptually.
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Even if we accept that: 1) contextual considerations did not prevent 
action, 2) WWS (as the initiator) created the opportunity for a flexible 
joining to the referendum initiative, and 3) PiS had adequate resources, it 
is difficult to determine what objectives were pursued by PiS’s politicians: 
forcing H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz to resign would be merely symbolic, since 
PiS did not have a candidate with a real chance of winning in the possi‑
ble presidential elections (in the polls Piotr Gliński was clearly behind not 
only H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz, but also Ryszard Kalisz). In other words, the PiS 
campaign lacked a basic strategic consideration, namely that of the primary 
objective in its engagement in the campaign preceding the referendum:
1. If the objective was a symbolic victory (dismissal of H. Gronkiewicz-
Waltz), there was clearly no answer to the question how to mobilize the 
residents of Warsaw: by reference to local values or by stressing party 
values.
2. If the strategic objectives were connected with the upcoming election 
cycle, then the actions taken should be clearly aimed at:
a) the mobilisation of its own electorate (domination of party values in its 
  messages);
b) investing in the future by attempting to present P. Gliński as a future 
  (2014) candidate in the election of the President of Warsaw (a “long 
  march” strategy).
Failure to form a stance with regard to the fundamental strategic dilemmas 
resulted in a professional, but not very dynamic, campaign, which in spite of 
making references to very noble values, lacked mobilisation potential and was 
directed at an undefined audience. It can thus be concluded that only in the TV 
spot “W as in Great Warsaw” it was possible to maintain a balance between 
references to instrumental values (with an attempt to indicate both problems 
requiring solutions, as well as the target groups of the campaign) and the dif‑
ficult to grasp ideological values (a reference to the vision of the Great Warsaw 
did not fit the context of the campaign preceding the dismissal referendum). 
The problems of Law and Justice were aggravated by the fact that, apart from 
the Warsaw Self -Government Community,8 other political groups did not 
organise any activities during the referendum campaign, reinforcing the nega‑
tive media image of the campaign as yet another clash between PiS and PO.
However, the Civic Platform chose the simplest, and one of the most 
inexpensive, strategic options — to take actions aiming to reduce turnout in 
the referendum and thereby maintain power in Warsaw. Two main strategies 
were adopted:
8 WWS took active measures in the last two weeks before the referendum, mainly via the 
Internet (and outdoor advertisement of questionable quality), exposing the current issues of 
the high prices of tickets for public transport, budget cuts in education, growth of the admin‑
istration, poor investment oversight).
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1. Making use of the potential of the system of power in Warsaw, notably to 
increase the activity of H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz and introduce some of the 
demands of the inhabitants of Warsaw.
2. Reducing the motivation to participate (a well thought -out Internet cam‑
paign entitled “I choose to vote next year,” with a precisely selected target 
group: hesitant voters and PO supporters). This campaign was strongly 
supported by messages communicated in the media by D. Tusk (16 July) 
and President Bronisław Komorowski (7 August), which clearly under‑
mined the point of holding a referendum.
Surprisingly, despite the high media coverage, the referendum on the dis‑
missal of the President of Warsaw Hanna Gronkiewicz -Waltz before the end 
of her term in office, turned out to be an event of relatively small significance. 
In marketing terms, the result of the referendum is considered as unresolved: 
H. Gronkiewicz -Waltz kept her post9 (PO’s gain), but as many as 94.86% of 
voters were in favour of dismissing the president (PiS’s gain10). The main 
reason for this state of affairs was the low level of professionalism of the pre-
election campaign, resulting largely from the absence of a conviction about 
the crucial importance of the long -term (in -between -election) political strat‑
egy in the process of the rational management of political parties, including 
organization and execution of campaigns and projects not directly connect‑
ed with the elections, which should be aimed at improving, maintaining or 
defending the current market position.
 9 The turnout of 25.66% meant that there were more than 50,000 votes missing to rec‑
ognize the validity of the referendum.
10 It is difficult to assess whether the result was worth spending nearly 400,000 PLN in 
the pre -election year. See: http://wyborcza.pl/1.75478.14781556.Ile_kosztowało_referendum 
(accessed 10.7.2014). 
